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FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
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Abstract 
The Dutch Parliament has passed legislation for a new income tax that abolishes the 
current tax on personal capital income and substitutes it by a presumptive capital 
income tax, which is in fact a net wealth tax. This paper contrasts this wealth tax with 
a conventional realization-based capital gains tax, a retrospective capital gains tax 
which attempts to charge interest on the deferred tax, and a capital accretion tax 
which taxes capital gains as they accrue. None of the approaches meets all criteria for 
a 'good' income tax, i.e., equity, efficiency, and administrative feasibility. We thus 
conclude that the effective and neutral taxation of capital income can best be ensured 
through a combination of (a) a capital accretion tax to capture the returns on easy-to-
value financial products, (b) a capital gains tax with interest to tax the returns on hard-
to-value real estate and small businesses, and (c) a broad presumptive capital income 
tax, i.e., a net wealth tax, to account for the utility of holding wealth. We favor 
uniform and moderate proportional tax rates in the context of a dual income tax under 
which capital income is taxed separately from labor income.  
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FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Sijbren Cnossen*  and Lans Bovenberg * *  
1. Introduction 
In September 1999, the Dutch Government submitted a bill for a new personal income 
tax to the Lower House of Parliament. The bill was approved in February 2000 and 
subsequently passed by the Upper House in May of the same year.1 The act, which 
becomes effective as of January 1, 2001, is part of a broader tax reform package 
aimed at stimulating employment and protecting the natural environment. Apart from 
a general cut in the overall tax burden, direct taxes on labor income are reduced in 
exchange for an increase in indirect taxes on consumption and pollutants. Most of the 
popular appeal of the tax reform can be attributed to the lowering of the top marginal 
tax rates on personal income and increased in-work benefits for those earning low 
labor incomes, reflecting the preferences of the two main coalition partners, i.e. the 
free-market liberals and the social democrats. 
The most radical change in the new personal income tax is the introduction of a 
presumptive tax on personal capital income. Henceforth, the taxable returns on 
personally held assets, such as savings deposits, stocks and bonds, and real estate 
(excluding owner-occupied housing), will be set at a presumptive percentage of 4% of 
the value of these assets net of liabilities, regardless of the actual returns. The amount 
thus computed will be taxed at a rate of 30%. The presumptive capital income tax is 
thus equivalent to a net wealth tax or a net assets tax levied at a rate of 1.2% (i.e., 
30% of 4%).  The presumptive capital income tax replaces the progressive tax on 
actual personal capital income, i.e., interest, dividends, and rental income (capital 
gains on personally held assets are currently not taxable in the Netherlands), as well 
as the existing net wealth tax.2 
The presumptive capital income tax is unique in the industrialized world. In contrast 
to the Netherlands, other countries, including most other member states of the 
European Union and the United States, impose a capital gains tax, separately or in 
conjunction with a personal income tax on other actual capital income. Interestingly, 
most of these countries are in the process of strengthening their capital gains taxes. A 
drawback of conventional realization-based capital gains taxes is that the effective tax 
rate declines with the holding period of the asset. To repair the attendant deferral 
effect, the scholarly literature has developed a retrospective capital gains tax which 
charges interest on the deferred tax at the time of realization. Recently, this literature 
                                                                 
* Erasmus University Rotterdam, Maastricht University, and New York University. 
** Tilburg University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and CEPR.  
1 See Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001, State Gazette, May 11, 2000, nrs 215 and 216. For the initial 
explanatory memorandum, see Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 26727, nr. 2. Additional legislation dealing 
with transitional and some other issues will be introduced before 2001. 
2 The existing net wealth tax is levied at a rate of 0.7 % on the value of all assets net of liabilities. 
Compared to the new presumptive capital income tax, the current net wealth tax features a broader 
base, which  includes owner-occupied housing and the equity capital of proprietorships and closely-
held companies. However, the existing net wealth tax features a more generous basic exemption 
(90,756 euro per individual) than the new presumptive capital income tax (17,000 euro per individual). 
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has also drawn attention to the feasibility of a so-called capital accretion tax which, 
for a long time, has been the normative goal for the taxation of capital income. In 
addition to current capital income, all personal capital gains would be taxed, 
regardless of whether these gains have been realized or not. 
This paper evaluates the Dutch presumptive capital income tax as well as its principal 
alternatives. We first provide a brief overview of the Dutch tax reform, which takes a 
schedular approach to taxing personal income by allocating various income items to a 
number of so-called boxes (section 2). Subsequently, we characterize the tax reform 
and review the major ways in which personal capital income, broadly defined, can be 
taxed (section 3). Against this background, the alternatives are explored in greater 
detail: the presumptive capital income tax (section 4), a conventional realization-
based capital gains tax (section 5), a retrospective capital gains tax (section 6), and a 
capital accretion tax (section 7).  
All alternatives appear to suffer from particular shortcomings, as summarized in the 
final section 8. We conclude that an approach that combines elements from all 
alternatives is the least unattractive option, particularly if the taxes are levied at a 
moderate, uniform rate on all capital income, separately from the tax on labor income. 
In our view, the capital income component of this dual income tax should comprise 
(a) a capital accretion tax to capture the returns on easy-to-value liquid assets, such as 
financial products, (b) a capital gains tax to tax the returns on hard-to-value illiquid 
assets, such as real estate and small businesses, and (c) a broad presumptive capital 
income tax, i.e. a net wealth tax, to account for the utility of holding wealth. At the 
business level, the tax mix should include the corporation tax (to tax the return on 
equity) and a withholding tax on interest (coordinated with other countries).  
2. Outline of the tax reform 
For a good understanding of how capital income is taxed under the new act, this 
section briefly reviews the entire new Dutch income tax. Scheme 1 summarizes the 
main elements. Under the new personal income tax, taxable personal income is 
assigned to one of three so-called boxes. As shown in the scheme, box 1 consists 
mainly of labor income items. These items include the labor income that a self-
employed person (proprietor) earns in his or her business (labeled business profits for 
tax purposes) and the fictitious wage attributed to the director-shareholder of a 
closely-held company.3 
[Scheme 1] 
                                                                 
3 The fictitious wage income of a director-shareholder that is taxable in box 1 is generally deemed to be 
euro 40,454, but, exceptionally, the wage income can be higher or lower if commensurate with the 
director's position. This anti-avoidance provision was introduced in 1997 to discourage director-
shareholders from  relabeling their labor income as company profits. The provision has lost much of its 
significance following the reduction of the top income tax rate to 52% and the introduction of relatively 
low effective tax rates in box 3 (see below), which should stimulate profit distributions. 
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Also some capital income items are included in box 1. The most important ones are 
the proceeds of capital that proprietors employ in their own businesses and the income 
from owner-occupied housing (i.e. presumptive rental income minus mortgage 
interest).4 Also interest, rental income and realized capital gains on assets put at the 
disposal of closely-held companies by dominant shareholders5 are allocated to this 
box. This anti-avoidance provision prevents these shareholders from shifting their 
taxable income away from box 1, which is subject to relatively high marginal tax 
rates, towards box 3, which features lower effective tax rates. The sum of labor and 
capital income allocated to box 1 is taxed at progressive rates ranging from 32.9% in 
the first bracket (comprising mainly social security contributions) to 52% in the top 
bracket. The tax thus computed is reduced by a number of tax credits (including 
substantial in-work benefits), which can be applied only to the income of this box. 
Profit distributions of closely-held companies, in which particular shareholders hold a 
dominant stake, are allocated to box 2. Also included in this box are capital gains 
realized when a part or the whole of a dominant holding is sold. The nominal personal 
tax rate on these income items is 25%, but the effective overall tax rate is higher, 
because these items are subject also to the corporation tax of 35%. Scheme 1 indicates 
that the labor income of a director-shareholder, if and to the extent this income 
exceeds his fictitious wage, and the retained profits of a closely-held company are 
subject to the corporation tax in box 4. In contrast to box 1, effective tax rates on 
capital income allocated to box 2 vary depending on the extent to which the 
realization of capital gains is deferred. 
Box 3 includes (the returns on) individually held assets, such as savings deposits, 
stocks, bonds, and real estate (except owner-occupied housing). The items in this box 
are subject to the presumptive capital income tax. The statutory rate is 30% on a 
presumptive return of 4%. The resulting nominal tax rate of 1.2% on the value of the 
taxable assets is thus proportional. Expressed as a percentage of the actual return, 
however, the tax liability differs between assets depending on the actual return. 
Specifically, the effective tax rate on the actual return is lower (higher) than 30% if 
the actual return is higher (lower) than 4%. If the actual return is 8%, for instance, the 
effective tax rate (expressed as a percentage of that actual return) amounts to only 
15% rather than the statutory tax rate of 30% (i.e., the rate at which the presumptive 
return of 4% is taxed). Viewed as a tax on actual capital income, the presumptive tax 
on capital income is thus regressive. The higher the actual return becomes, the lower 
is the tax expressed as a percentage of that return. 
Scheme 1 includes a fourth box – not mentioned in the new income tax act –  in which 
the current profits of corporations (publicly- and closely-held companies) are subject 
to the corporation tax – an adjunct to the personal income tax – at a statutory rate of 
35%. The tax reform does not affect this box; corporate entities are taxed under a 
separate act. The classical corporate tax system, under which distributed profits are 
taxed separately at the company level (under the corporation tax) and the shareholder 
level (under the income tax), is thus maintained. Nevertheless, the reform of the 
                                                                 
4 Presumptive rental income from owner-occupied housing is computed as 1.25% of the value of the 
property which is well below market rental values. Since nominal interest on mortgages can be 
deducted in full, the income from owner-occupied housing is typically negative.  
5 A shareholder (with or without associated persons) is deemed to be a dominant shareholder for tax 
purposes if (s)he owns at least 5% of the shares of a (closely-held) company. 
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personal capital income tax importantly alters the economic effects of the classical 
system, as explained below.  
A fifth box – also not mentioned in the new act – includes tax exempt capital income. 
In particular, pension savings can accumulate without attracting capital income tax. 
Moreover, non-residents are generally not taxed by the Dutch tax authorities on the 
return of their debt holdings in the Netherlands (the return on equity paid to non-
residents, in contrast, is subject to corporation tax).  
3. Alternative ways of taxing capital income 
a. How should the tax reform be characterized? 
Capital income can be taxed on the basis of either the actual (ex-post) return or the 
expected (ex-ante) return. An ex-ante tax includes in its base the normal risk-free 
return to capital (i.e., the return to waiting) and any foreseeable above-normal returns 
associated with tradable assets. By capitalizing these latter returns in asset values, 
financial arbitrage in efficient and transparent capital markets ensures that ex-ante 
returns (adjusted for risk) on various tradable assets are in fact equalized. In addition 
to the returns included in the base of an ex-ante tax, an ex post tax taxes the additional 
return originating in investor-specific abilities (which can be viewed as remuneration 
for the application of human capital) and information advantages. This additional 
return escapes the ex ante tax, because superior investor insight is associated with the 
investor instead of the asset and, hence, is not be capitalized in asset values. Another 
important difference between the two approaches involves the treatment of risk. Only 
under an ex-post tax does the government consistently share in the risk of the 
investor.  
The presumptive capital income tax (and hence the equivalent net wealth tax) is an 
ex-ante tax on the expected investment return. A capital gains tax and a capital 
accretion tax, in contrast, are ex-post taxes. These two ex-post taxes differ, however, 
with respect to the application of the realization rule. A capital gains tax includes only 
realized capital gains in its base – usually without interest on the deferred tax, but at 
the time of realization interest could in principle be charged by a so-called 
retrospective capital gains tax. A capital accretion tax, in contrast, taxes all accrued 
gains, including the gains that have not yet been realized. 
This taxonomy reveals that various types of capital income are taxed differently under 
the new Dutch income tax. Capital income is sometimes taxed on an ex-ante basis, 
sometimes on an ex-post basis, and sometimes not at all. In addition, the rates at 
which (ex-ante or ex-post) capital income is taxed vary; sometimes the rates are 
proportional, but in other cases progressive rates apply. Specifically –  
· The return on equity, including capital gains, invested in proprietorships and 
closely-held companies is taxed on an ex-post basis – at progressive rates if 
accruing in proprietorships and at proportional rates if accruing in closely-held 
companies. Capital gains are taxed on a realization basis without interest on the 
deferred tax. 
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· The return on equity (shares) invested in publicly-held companies is taxed on an 
ex-post basis at the company level and on an ex-ante basis at the personal level. At 
both levels proportional rates apply. 
· The return on individually held assets, such as savings deposits, debt claims and 
real estate is generally taxed on an ex-ante basis at the personal level. This applies 
also to owner-occupied property – be it that the presumptive return is merely 
1.25% (which is considerably lower than the presumptive return of 4 % in box 3) 
and that the presumptive return is taxed at progressive rates (in box 1) instead of 
at a proportional rate (in box 3). Exceptionally, the return on debt capital and real 
estate put at the disposal of closely-held companies by dominant shareholders is 
taxed on an ex post basis at progressive rates (in box 1). 
· The returns on savings held in pension funds and debt claims of non-residents are 
not taxed. Depending on the difference between the tax rate at which pension 
contributions are deductible and the tax rate at which pension payouts are taxable, 
the return on pension savings is in fact subsidized through the tax system.6   
b. What are the alternatives? 
All types of capital income could be taxed in a uniform way, that is to say, only on an 
ex-ante basis or only on an ex-post basis – and in the latter case on a realization basis 
(with or without interest on the deferred tax) or an accretion basis. Under each of 
these four alternatives, the capital income items in Scheme 1 would have to be 
reallocated as follows: 
· Presumptive capital income tax 
All capital income would be taxed on an ex-ante basis in the same manner as the 
assets in box 3. Accordingly, capital invested in proprietorships and owner-occupied 
housing (allocated to box 1 from January 1, 2001 onwards) would have to be 
transferred to box 3. The same applies to capital invested in closely-held companies, 
whether directly (in box 2) or indirectly (in box 1). In principle, also pension savings 
(box 5) could be placed in box 3. The corporation tax (box 4) could be abolished.  
· Capital gains tax 
All capital income, current as well as realized capital gains, would be taxed on an ex-
post basis in the same way as the income of assets assigned to box 2. This implies that 
the assets currently assigned to boxes 1 and 3 would be transferred to box 2. In 
principle, the exemption for capital income from pension savings would have to be 
abolished. The corporation tax could be maintained, but in taxing dividends and 
capital gains at the level of the individual, the corporation tax attributable to 
distributed profits should be credited against the personal income tax on the grossed-
up dividends (imputation system) and a write-up of basis of shares by retained profits 
net of corporation tax should be permitted when taxing capital gains. 
                                                                 
6 The return on pension savings is taxed at the time the pension benefit is paid out. This tax is exactly 
equal to the advantage of tax deferral on the paid-in contributions if the rates at which benefits are 
taxed coincide with the rates at which the contributions are deductible. Under these circumstances, 
therefore, income from pension savings is in fact tax exempt. However, since the rates at which 
pension benefits are taxed are generally lower than the rates at which contributions can be deducted,  
pension savings are typically subsidized.  
 6 
· Retrospective capital gains tax 
All capital income would be taxed in the same manner as under a conventional capital 
gains tax, but, in addition, interest would be charged on the deferred tax as if the gains 
had been taxed as they accrued. 
· Capital accretion tax 
All capital income would be taxed on an ex-post basis and all accrued capital gains 
would be taxed on the basis of the accretion principle – also at the level of 
proprietorships and pension funds. For closely- and publicly-held companies, the 
accretion tax could imply that the corporation tax should be abolished. Alternatively, 
the corporation tax could serve as a withholding tax at the company level for the 
capital income and accretion tax at the individual level. 
The following sections evaluate these four alternatives on the basis of generally 
accepted criteria for a 'good' income tax, namely equity (ability-to-pay), neutrality, 
and enforcement. The ability-to-pay criterion requires a comprehensive definition of 
income, defined as the sum of consumption and the real accretion of wealth in some 
period (generally, the calendar year).7  Neutrality implies that fundamental economic 
signals rather than tax considerations should guide the behavior of investors and 
entrepreneurs. This general principle is violated if the tax to be paid depends on the 
choice between lending or investing, the form in which a business is conducted, or its 
financing structure and dividend policy. Enforcement means that opportunities for 
arbitrage (strategic trading purely for tax advantages) are minimized. 
4. Presumptive capital income tax 
a. Equity considerations 
Taxing capital income on a presumptive basis violates ability-to-pay measured in 
terms of income. Firstly, under a presumptive capital income tax, the government 
exempts above normal returns that originate in superior investment insight and 
information advantages. These additional returns, which are attributable to the 
application of labor and other investor-specific production factors, escape tax. This is 
in contrast to above-normal returns due to superior entrepreneurial skills applied in 
businesses. These returns are taxed at the business level at the progressive personal 
income tax rates (of up to 52%) or at the corporation tax rate (of 35%).  
Secondly, under a presumptive capital income tax, the government does not share in 
the good and bad luck of investors. This violates the ability-to-pay criterion and may 
also harm efficiency. In particular, if private risk pooling is inefficient, the 
government may be better equipped to pool investment risks, for example because of 
its ability to share risks across generations through public debt policy. By stepping 
back as insurance agent, the government foregoes the insurance premium, i.e., the tax 
                                                                 
7 This is generally known as the S-H-S (Schanz-Haig-Simons) concept of income, after the authors 
who originally introduced the concept, i.e. George Schanz, Robert M. Haig, and Henry C. Simons. See, 
especially, Simons (1938) and for a modern interpretation Goode (1975). Taking the criteria for a good 
income tax as our point of departure, we assume that ability to pay should be measured by income – 
largely a value judgment . We realize, however, that wealth and consumption can also be appropriate 
tax bases for assessing ability-to-pay. 
 7 
on the risk premium. If the government effectively pools risks, this latter tax is not a 
burden on the private sector: rather, it is the price that the private sector is willing to 
pay to the government for pooling  macroeconomic risks.  
b. Neutrality 
The effects of the new tax regime on economic choices differ from the effects under 
the old regime. We consider the differential impacts on the financing structure of 
businesses and the form in which a business is conducted. 
Debt versus equity 
The current Dutch income tax regime encourages publicly-held companies to finance 
their investments through profit retention rather than debt. This is because the 
corporation tax rate (35 % plus the 0% tax rate on personal capital gains) is typically 
lower than the progressive rates (of up to 60 %) of the personal income tax at which 
interest accruing to higher income groups (where share- and debt holdings are 
concentrated) is taxed. Accordingly, profit retention enables shareholders to reduce 
the tax rate on the return of their investments from the relatively high personal income 
tax rate to the relatively low corporation tax rate.  
The presumptive capital income tax reverses the privileged position of retained profits 
versus debt. In particular, the relatively high personal income tax rate (of up to 60 %) 
on actual nominal interest income is replaced by a relatively low 30%-rate on a 
presumptive return of only 4%. This wealth tax of 1.2% on the value of debt holdings 
applies also to shareholdings. Hence, the current personal income tax on actual capital 
income, which taxes the return on debt but exempts capital gains (i.e., the return on 
equity), is replaced by a wealth tax (i.e., the presumptive capital income tax), which 
taxes not only debt but also equity. The tax discrimination against equity at the 
corporate level (the normal return on equity is, in contrast to interest, not deductible in 
ascertaining taxable profits) is therefore no longer mitigated by tax concessions for 
equity at the personal level (the current personal income tax exempts capital gains but 
taxes interest). On account of the tax discrimination of equity under the corporation 
tax, shareholders, under the new regime, benefit from profit distributions, which they 
can subsequently invest in bonds. Similarly, dominant shareholders in closely-held 
companies are stimulated to withdraw their equity from the company and replace it by 
debt or leased real estate. However, a (complicated) anti-avoidance provision in the 
new act taxes all income on capital put at the disposal of such companies in box 1 (see 
Scheme 1). 
The quantitative analysis of Bovenberg and Ter Rele of the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) confirms that  retained earnings become a less 
attractive source of finance than debt. Bovenberg and Ter Rele compute the cost of 
capital for marginal investments under both the current and the new regime. Their 
calculations assume an inflation rate of 2 % and a real rate of interest that is 
exogenously fixed at 4 % by international capital markets. Table 1 lists the costs of 
capital (under the current and the new regime) for three types of investors: individual 
investors facing average marginal tax rates, individual investors facing the top 
marginal tax rate, and institutional investors which do not pay any personal capital 
income taxes. Investors are assumed to arbitrage between the various investments so 
that each investor earns the same after-tax yield on all investments.  
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[Table 1] 
Table 1 shows that the tax reform leaves the cost of debt finance more or less 
unaffected. This cost rises slightly for proprietorships and owner-occupied housing 
because the reduction of the top marginal income tax rates reduces the value of 
interest deductions. The required return on retained earnings increases substantially 
for shareholders subject to the personal income tax. Under the current tax system, the 
cost of debt finance exceeds the cost of retained earnings for corporations that are 
financed by investors facing high marginal tax rates. Under the new income tax, in 
contrast, the required return on retained earnings exceeds that on debt for all types of 
Dutch investors, including investors facing high marginal tax rates. The documented 
larger gap between the cost of retained earnings and debt finance encourages 
corporations that rely on Dutch investors for their equity capital to increase their debt 
finance. The shareholdings of corporations that rely also on non-residents and tax-
exempt institutions for their equity needs will shift away from Dutch individual 
investors. 
The new tax system also raises the costs of equity finance in owner-occupied housing 
and proprietorships (see Table 1), for two reasons. Firstly, the abolition of the current 
system of personal wealth taxation, which includes tax preferences for business equity 
and owner-occupied housing, differentially raises equity costs. Secondly, owner-
occupied housing and the business equity of proprietors are taxed in box 1, but 
alternative financial investments are taxed in box 3. Hence, the costs of debt and 
equity are no longer treated symmetrically: the nominal interest costs of debt remain 
deductible at progressive rates in box 1, whereas the alternative investment of equity 
capital in the capital market is taxed at a proportional rate of only 30 % on a 
presumptive return of only 4 %. As is the case for corporate investments, the higher 
costs of equity finance will result in the substitution of debt for equity finance. 
Especially households subject to high marginal tax rates in box 1 face a substantial tax 
incentive to finance their own homes and businesses with debt and to invest their own 
equity in assets assigned to box 3. 
Retained profits versus new shares 
Under the current regime, financing through retained profits is more advantageous 
than financing through issuing new shares (see Table 1). After all, the cost of profit 
retention (i.e., the net dividend that shareholders forego) is lower than the cost of new 
equity. The presumptive capital income tax, in contrast, does not depend on the form 
in which the return on equity is enjoyed (dividend or capital gain). As a direct 
consequence, the decision to distribute profits is no longer being distorted and issuing 
new shares is no longer less attractive (apart from transaction costs) than retaining 
profits.8 This should shift equity capital from mature companies (insiders), which 
generate retained profits, to new rapidly growing companies (outsiders), which have 
to rely on the external capital market to attract equity. In this way, the new tax regime 
should promote a more efficient allocation of capital and facilitate the entry of new 
firms. 
                                                                 
8 Table 1 shows that new shares still suffer from a slight  tax disadvantage compared to retained 
earnings. This is due to a separate low-rate tax on newly paid-in capital.    
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Business form 
The tax reform heralds the further demise of the closely-held company. Prior to 1997, 
this business form was greatly favored, because current profits were taxed at the 
corporation tax rate of 35%, while (deferred) profit distributions and realized capital 
gains on dominant holdings attracted 20% tax, instead of the progressive income tax 
rates up to 60% levied on other income. Director-shareholders, moreover, could 
transform their labor income into capital income without any limit. In 1997, a 
fictitious wage was imputed to director-shareholders and the tax rate on distributions 
and capital gains was raised to 25%. Under the new income tax, the gap vis-à-vis the 
proprietorship form is narrowed further. Although the self-employed are subject to 
higher personal income tax rates (up to 52%), they benefit from being able to deduct 
interest on debt applied in the business at those rates and from the relatively lower 
presumptive tax rate (in box 3) on financial investments outside their own businesses. 
Beyond that, the new tax regime introduces various anti-avoidance provisions under 
which the income from debt capital and real estate that dominant shareholders put at 
the disposal of closely-held companies is taxed at progressive rates in box 1 (see 
Scheme 1). 
c. Enforcement 
Under the presumptive capital income tax, the arbitrage opportunities between various 
income items taxed at varying rates are confined to five boxes (see Scheme 1). Under 
the current tax regime, investors face a tax incentive to borrow (and deduct the 
interest expense at high marginal rates) and invest the funds in financial products that 
generate their returns mainly in the form of capital gains, which escape the personal 
income tax. Under the new tax regime, in contrast, the tax incentive to borrow 
vanishes in box 3, because the presumptive capital income tax does not make a 
distinction between interest, dividends, and capital gains. However, the progressive 
tax rate structure is maintained in box 1. Moreover, different proportional tax rates 
apply in boxes 2 and 4, the income tax on pension savings in box 5 can be deferred, 
and the return on debt remains exempt from corporation tax. Thus, an incentive 
remains to relabel highly taxed income items into items subject to lower tax rates. 
For individuals earning high labor incomes, it becomes more attractive under the new 
regime to finance the purchase of their home by debt. In the event, these individuals 
benefit fully from the deduction of the nominal mortgage interest against the top 
marginal rate of the personal income tax in box 1, while they are able to invest their 
own equity against the 30% rate on a relatively low presumptive return in box 3. This 
form of tax arbitrage erodes the tax base in box 1, undermines the effective 
progressivity of the income tax, and distorts the allocation of capital and risk. 
The increased attraction of debt finance for companies (especially compared to 
retained profits) erodes the base of the corporation tax. Dominant shareholders face a 
tax incentive to transfer equity from the business level to the personal level. In this 
way, income is shifted from box 4 and box 2 to box 3. Other arbitrage opportunities 
can also be foreseen, such as the transformation of progressively taxed labor income 
into lower taxed capital income and the manipulation of assets around the dates at 
which the presumptive income tax ascertains the value of taxable assets (twice a 
year). The weak spots of the current tax regime are well known. Taxpayers and the 
legislator still have to discover the loopholes of the new regime. No doubt, taxpayers 
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will uncover tax avoidance strategies, which neither the tax authorities nor we 
anticipate yet.  
d. Towards a comprehensive presumptive capital income tax? 
By excluding owner-occupied housing, equity in closely-held companies and 
proprietorships and pension wealth, the presumptive capital income tax features a 
relatively small base. Accordingly, tax fences continue to be necessary between the 
various boxes in order to limit the opportunities for tax arbitrage. These tax fences 
substantially complicate the new tax, as indicated above. Broadening the base of the 
presumptive tax would reduce the need for tax fences. In particular, the rental value of 
owner-occupied property could gradually be increased from the current return of 
1.25% of the value of the property to a presumptive return of 4%. At that point, 
owner-occupied housing could be moved from box 1 to box 3. The inclusion of the 
business equity of proprietors and the equity capital (as well as selected assets now in 
box 1) of dominant shareholders in closely-held companies in the tax base would 
further broaden the presumptive capital income tax. In addition, pension savings 
could gradually (and possibly partly) become subject to the presumptive capital 
income tax. These changes would transform the presumptive capital income tax into a 
comprehensive net wealth tax and confine the base of the personal income tax to labor 
income. 
5. Capital gains tax 
If actual capital income would be taxed comprehensively, interest, dividend and rental 
income would have to be included in the base (as is the case under the current 
regime). Beyond that, capital gains would have to be taxed. In the Netherlands, capital 
gains tax is already being levied on the sale of a dominant holding in a closely-held 
company and on business assets. Capital gains are not taxed, however, when 
personally held assets, such as securities and real estate, are sold. In designing the tax 
reform, the Dutch cabinet rejected a capital gains tax on these assets for the following 
reasons: asset holders would defer the realization of capital gains thereby distorting 
ownership and risk patterns, risk taking would be harmed, correcting the taxable 
return for inflation would be difficult, and fairness required that tax be levied when 
liquid funds would be available. These arguments are evaluated on the basis of the 
existing literature.9 
a. Deferral and lock-in  
The main objection against a capital gains tax based on the realization principle is that 
the tax is largely elective. Indeed, the effective tax rate on capital gains declines with 
the holding period of an asset. Deferral implies that the taxpayer can reinvest the 
deferred capital gain against the current (compounded) tax-free rate of return. In fact 
the return on the capital gain attributable to the deferral goes untaxed. To illustrate, if 
the nominal rate of a capital gains tax is 30% and the interest rate (before tax) is 6%, 
then the effective tax rate on one euro of tax which does not have to be paid now but 
                                                                 
9 For one of the latest contributions, see Burman (1999). For the economic effects of a capital gains tax, 
see also Auerbach (1988) and Auten and Cordes (1991)). For an early review of the literature on capital 
gains taxation, see Hoerner (1992). 
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after 3 years becomes 25.2% [0.03/(1 + 0.06)3]. This effective tax rate can be viewed 
as the weighted average of the rate of 30% on the original capital gain and a rate of 
0% on the additional return that accrues on account of deferral.  
Differences in the scope for tax deferral imply that capital gains are taxed at varying 
rates. This violates the ability-to-pay criterion. Furthermore, investors are encouraged 
to hold on to assets carrying substantial accrued capital gains, because the additional 
returns on investing these capital gains are in fact tax exempt. This so-called lock-in 
effect interferes with the efficient functioning of the capital market and distorts 
ownership patterns. Lock-in can also destabilize the stock market, because shares are 
sold when prices decline (to realize losses) and held onto when prices rise (to defer 
gains realization). Beyond that, taxing capital gains on a realization basis invites tax 
arbitrage. Investments on which capital gains can be deferred can be financed by 
loans of which the interest is immediately deductible. These tax induced transactions, 
which permit investors to have their cake and eat it too, erode the tax base. These 
issues are especially relevant for financial products sold in innovative capital markets, 
because modern financial markets allow investors to defer gains without having to 
assume additional risk. 
b. Risk taking behavior 
In rejecting a capital gains tax, the Dutch cabinet argued that countries levying capital 
gains taxes are increasingly being confronted with the harmful effects of such taxes 
on risk taking behavior. However, if capital losses are fully deductible, a capital gains 
tax should encourage rather than discourage risk taking. After all, loss taking (and the 
attendant tax relief) can be accelerated, whereas profits (and the attendant tax 
liabilities) can be deferred. Risky investments should thus become more attractive.10 
This subsidy to risk taking behavior, however, erodes the tax base. To prevent this, 
the tax authorities might want to put limitations on the deduction of losses from other 
taxable income. Such limits on loss taking discourage risk-taking behavior. The 
government thus faces a trade-off between protecting the tax base and encouraging 
risk taking.  
c. Correcting for inflation 
The Dutch cabinet pointed also to the need for a complex inflation correction. This 
argument, however, applies not only to capital gains but also to other forms of capital 
income. In principle, all capital income and expense items should be corrected for 
inflation. If only capital gains would be corrected for inflation, investors would be 
encouraged to buy assets yielding capital gains and to finance these purchases by 
loans (of which the inflation component of the nominal interest would be fully 
deductible). The asymmetric treatment of investments and loans thus erodes the tax 
base, distorts capital allocation, and invites tax arbitrage. Inflation corrections require 
complicated legislative provisions. At low inflation rates, therefore, most countries do 
not correct taxable capital income for inflation. The application of a moderate tax rate 
can mitigate the potentially harmful effects.  
                                                                 
 
10 Even without the asymmetric realization of gains and losses, a capital gains tax could stimulate risk 
taking compared to the presumptive income tax (i.e., a wealth tax). This would be the case if the 
government, which shares the risks of investors under an ex-post income tax, could better pool risks 
than the capital market (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980,  at 118).  
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d. Liquidity concerns 
The realization rules is based on the notion that tax payments can be demanded only if 
liquid funds are available.11 In modern financial markets, however, this rule is 
increasingly at odds with the ability-to-pay criterion: realization is a matter of 
portfolio management rather than income definition. Securities, especially if traded on 
the stock exchange, are as liquid as a bank deposit. In any case, other income items, 
such as the rental value of owner-occupied property, are also taxed in the Netherlands 
without liquid funds necessarily being available. The same holds true for ex-ante 
taxes, such as the current net wealth tax and the newly proposed presumptive capital 
income tax.  
In summary, the realization rule has made the capital gains tax largely elective, while 
anti-deferral provisions have greatly complicated the application of the tax. Even 
these provisions have no teeth if capital gains can be passed on untaxed at death by 
assuming that the heirs acquire the capital assets of the deceased at market value.12 In 
the Netherlands, proprietors and dominant shareholders of closely-held companies 
have to pay tax on accrued capital gains at the time of death. In a similar fashion, if a 
comprehensive capital gains tax were adopted, individual taxpayers should incur tax 
on their capital gains at the time of death.  
6. Retrospective capital gains taxation 
The tax literature has developed various methods to eliminate the incentive to defer 
realization (and hence the lock-in effect) by charging interest on the deferred tax at 
the time of realization. Under the Auerbach (1991) method, when an asset is disposed 
of, the value at sale is deemed to have resulted from appreciation at the risk-free 
interest rate from the date of purchase. Tax is due on this deferred interest with 
additional interest thereon to compensate for the value of deferral. Under the 
Auerbach method, the investor-specific risk premium escapes the tax.13 Information 
requirements are minimal. Since the tax owed on the asset is independent of the 
purchase price, only the sale price and the length of the holding period have to be 
observed. 
While the Auerbach method solves the efficiency (lock-in) issue, ability-to-pay 
(measured by income) is not fully satisfied because the investor-specific risk premium 
goes untaxed. The Bradford (1995) method, in contrast, does tax this risk premium. 
Bradford requires the taxpayer to set a Gain Reference Date (GRD) and a Gain Tax 
Rate (GRT) at the time of the investment. As under the Auerbach method, taxable 
income is computed at the time of realization by assuming that the capital asset has 
increased in value at the risk-free interest rate from the GRD. Furthermore, the 
purchase price is presumed to have increased in value at the risk-free rate until the 
                                                                 
11 This rule also plays an important role in determining taxable profits. Indeed, the realization principle 
is closely associated with sound accounting principles. 
12 This is the rule in the United States where some 50% of the potential base of the capital gains tax 
leaks away because the  'angel of death' pays a visit. See Gravelle (1995).  
13 Auerbach (1991) notes that his approach captures the capital gain attributable to the capitalized idea 
of the investor but fails to capture the initial income associated with the idea. He suggests that special 
rules would be necessary in "such special and easily identifiable cases." 
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GRD. Tax is charged on both presumed increases with interest on the deferred tax. In 
contrast to the Auerbach method, the Bradford method charges tax at the GRT on the 
investor-risk premium, which is presumed to have been capitalized at the GRD. 
Interest is also charged on this capital gain. Obviously, the information requirements 
under the Bradford method are substantially greater than under the Auerbach method: 
in addition, values at the time of purchase and the GRD have to be observed, as well 
as the GRD and the GRT themselves.  
Retrospective capital gains taxation also brings problems in its train. While it 
eliminates time-shifting tax planning, it creates an incentive for entity-shifting tax 
planning, whereby taxpayers shift income across assets. That incentive arises under a 
retrospective capital gains tax because effective tax rates on excess returns vary across 
assets.14 Nevertheless, the general idea of maintaining the realization principle with 
interest on the deferred tax seems worthy of consideration if taxation at the time of 
accretion is problematic on account of valuation and cash-flow problems for 
particular assets, such as real estate and small businesses. 
7. Capital accretion tax  
According to the S-H-S income concept, the annual accretion of wealth is the most 
ideal base for taxing capital income.15 Effective tax rates coincide with statutory rates 
and lock-in effects are eliminated. The tax liability is settled annually so that no large 
potential capital gains tax liabilities are carried forward that have to be paid at some 
future date. Tax avoidance is thus more difficult and less rewarding. As a direct 
consequence, administrative and compliance costs are lower.  
In the United States, the desirability and feasibility of a capital accretion tax, or mark-
to-market tax  as the tax is called, receives increasing attention in the scholarly 
literature.16 Most analysts agree, however, that political and administrative obstacles 
lie in the way of taxing illiquid assets, such as real estate (especially owner-occupied 
housing) and business assets, on an accretion basis. The discussion therefore focuses 
on delimitating these illiquid capital assets (which should continue to be subject to the 
prevailing capital gains tax) from the assets that should fall under the mark-to-market 
tax, on valuation issues, and on the relationship between the tax rate of the mark-to-
market tax and the realization-based capital gains tax. 
On delimitation, agreement appears to be emerging that securities, such as stocks, 
bonds, derivatives and debt claims, can be included in the base of the mark-to-market 
tax, while real estate and small businesses should be subject to a conventional capital 
gains tax. As regards the valuation of specified securities, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in the United States believes that derivatives do not present 
insurmountable problems. Indeed, companies are already obliged to publish the 
market value of all their financial instruments. As regards tax rates, Weisbach (2000) 
                                                                 
14 This issue is alluded to by Auerbach (1991). For a general treatment, see also Knoll (1998). 
15 In the United States, this approach is already applied to specific derivatives, such as options, futures, 
forwards, and swaps. 
16 For a pioneering article, see Shakov (1986), and for a general treatment, also Halperin (1997). The 
discussion in this section draws on Weisbach (2000) who favors a mixed accretion/capital gains tax system. 
For an interesting view, see also Schenk (2000) who favors a presumptive income tax. 
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points out that the average effective tax rate on capital gains should closely 
approximate the capital accretion tax rate. This could be achieved by charging interest 
on the capital gains tax under the assumption that the gain has accrued over the 
holding period in line with, say, the average price index for the hard-to-value asset, 
such as real estate. 
Special attention should be given to the interaction of the capital accretion tax and the 
corporation tax. In principle, the corporation tax would become redundant, because 
distributed and retained profits would already be taxed under the capital accretion tax. 
The incentive to retain profits would be eliminated. If the corporation tax would be 
retained and interest remained deductible in ascertaining taxable profits, equity would 
be discriminated against compared with debt. The corporation tax, however, could be 
reformed to function as a withholding tax for the capital accretion tax – whereby the 
tax on the return on equity as well as debt would be levied at source. 
8. Evaluation and preferred alternative 
a. Comparative analysis 
The Dutch Government has decided to abolish the tax on actual personal capital 
income and to introduce a partial net wealth tax. The new net wealth tax on savings 
deposits, securities and real estate is called a presumptive capital income tax. The tax 
rate of 1.2% on the value of these assets (net of liabilities) is computed as the product 
of a presumptive return of 4% and a proportional tax rate of 30%. At the same time, 
the existing net wealth tax is abolished, but the present tax on business profits – levied 
on the basis of actual returns, including capital gains – is maintained. This applies also 
to capital gains of shareholders owning a dominant holding in a closely-held 
company. 
A fundamental objection to the presumptive capital income tax is that it violates 
ability-to-pay measured in terms of income. The individual-specific investment 
premium (which can be associated especially with wealthy investors) escapes tax, 
while the government does not share in the good and bad luck of investors. Also, a 
capital gains tax based on the realization principle does not fully satisfy this ability-to-
pay criterion. After all, capital income earners are taxed at varying rates depending on 
the extent to which they are able to defer the realization of their capital gains. Only 
the capital accretion tax appears to meet the ability-to-pay criterion measured in terms 
of income. 
All approaches suffer from practical shortcomings. In particular, the presumptive 
capital income tax proposed by the Dutch Government worsens the discrimination of 
equity vis-à-vis debt. Furthermore, the small tax base distorts economic choices, 
encourages tax arbitrage, and harms revenue. Broadening the tax base would alleviate 
these problems. The presumptive capital income tax would then become akin to a 
comprehensive net wealth tax. Moreover, the asymmetry between the taxation of 
actual returns at the business level and presumptive returns at the individual level 
complicates coordination between the two levels. Last but not least, the presumptive 
capital income tax harms efforts to coordinate capital income taxes within the 
European Union. Whereas the Netherlands is resorting to ex-ante taxes on a 
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presumptive return, other member states are strengthening ex-post taxes on capital 
income, including capital gains taxes and withholding taxes. 
The major drawback of a conventional capital gains tax is that taxpayers are 
encouraged to defer the realization of capital gains and to accelerate the realization of 
capital losses. Complicated anti-avoidance provisions are often introduced to forestall 
this tax-driven behavior. This shortcoming can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by 
deeming realization to occur at death and by charging interest on the deferred tax. 
This points in the direction of a capital accretion tax. Generally, the problem with a 
capital accretion tax is that it is difficult to apply to real estate (including owner-
occupied housing) and small businesses due to serious valuation problems. For these 
assets, a capital gains tax regime (preferably with a rough-and-ready interest charge 
on deferred taxes) would have to be maintained.  
The valuation problems are smallest under a capital gains tax as long as no effort is 
made to charge interest on the deferred tax that correctly reflects the built-up of the 
gains over the holding period. In that case, the market generates the required 
information when the asset changes hands. For liquid financial products, financial 
markets provide the information needed by a presumptive capital income tax (net 
wealth tax), a capital gains tax that attempts to charge interest as gains accrue, and a 
capital accretion tax. Illiquid assets, however, have to be valued on a discretionary 
basis under these taxes. Interestingly, the Dutch presumptive capital income tax 
includes hard-to-value personal real estate in its base, including owner-occupied 
housing (albeit taxed in box 1 instead of box 3). This implies that the Dutch 
Government believes that real estate, as well as liquid financial products, can be 
valued annually for tax purposes.  Moreover, under the current net wealth tax, also 
small businesses have to be valued.  
Under all alternatives, the position of the corporation tax is important. If the 
corporation tax would be retained (after all, it also serves as a tax on equity income of 
non-residents), the double taxation of distributed profits could be eliminated through 
an imputation system or by exempting dividend income at the individual level (if the 
rate of the income tax equals the tax rate of the corporation tax). Permitting 
shareholders to write up bases of shares with retained profits can prevent double 
taxation of retained profits. Under a capital accretion tax, differentiating the tax rate 
between equity and debt can prevent the double taxation of distributed profits.17  
b. Preferred choice 
As the comparative evaluation clearly indicates, trade-offs have to be made between 
equity, efficiency, and feasibility in choosing between the various approaches to the 
taxation of capital income. On the basis of the arguments presented in this paper, we 
conclude that if income is chosen as the best measure of ability-to-pay, then the 
effective and neutral taxation of capital income can best be ensured through a 
combination of taxes at the business level and the individual level. At the business 
level, these taxes should include the corporation tax and a withholding tax on interest. 
Such taxes ensure that residents and non-residents pay the same tax on the return of 
an investment. At the individual level, a combination of the approaches discussed in 
                                                                 
17 In considering these measures, one should keep in mind that double taxation does not harm incentives of 
mature firms if the corporation tax is confined to above-normal returns or if the tax on future profit 
distributions is capitalized in lower share values. 
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this paper would be our preferred choice: (1) a capital accretion tax to tax the returns 
on financial products, (2) a capital gains tax to tax the returns on real estate (with 
interest on the deferred tax to reduce lock-in), and (3) a broad presumptive capital 
income tax, i.e., a net wealth tax, to account for the utility of holding wealth (and to 
tax residents differentially higher than non-residents).  
We favor a single uniform tax rate on all capital income. This would minimize 
deadweight losses arising from the non-neutral taxation of capital income (Auerbach, 
1989). A flat rate (without a basic exemption), moreover, reduces administrative and 
compliance costs, because capital income arising at the company level does not have 
to be attributed to individuals. If revenue needs dictate a higher tax rate on labor 
income, we favor the separation of actual capital income (taxable at a moderate flat 
rate) from labor income (taxable at higher rates). This would result in a dual income 
tax supplemented by a net wealth tax, as found in Finland and Norway (Sørensen, 
1994; Cnossen, 2000).  
An effective tax on capital income requires international coordination. This applies 
especially to withholding taxes on interest (the return on equity is already being taxed 
by the corporation tax). As long as international cooperation is not forthcoming, the 
tax on capital income should be designed in such a way that it (a) can be optimally 
attuned to international developments, including intensifying international capital 
mobility and international tax competition, and (b) is closely in step with the tax 
systems in other countries in order to facilitate international coordination. Again, this 
appears to call for a proportional tax rate on the return of mobile capital that is not 
captive to the tax rate on less mobile labor. 
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Scheme 1: Tax Reform in The Netherlands 
 
Box / tax rate Labor income Capital income 
   
Box 1 (natural persons) 
· 32,9%, 36,85%, 42%, 52% 
· General tax credit of euro 1,507 
· Earned income tax credit of euro 
803 
· Other tax credits for children, 
single parents, and elderly 
 
· Wages, salaries 
· Labor income of self-
employed 
· Presumptive wage income of 
director-shareholder of 
closely-held company 
· Pensions, social security 
benefits 
· Other labor income 
 
· Return on capital of self-employed 
· Presumptive rental value of owner-
occupied housing 
· Interest, rental income and capital 
gains on assets put at the disposal of 
closely-held companies by dominant 
shareholders1 
   
Box 2 (closely-held companies) 
· 35%2 
 
 
· 35%-51.25%3 
 
 
 
· Labor income of director-
shareholder in excess of 
presumptive wage inome3 
 
 
· Retained profits3 
 
 
· Distributed profits and capital gains 
on shares which form a dominant 
holding  
   
Box 3 (personal wealth)5 
· 30% 
 
 
· Lower than 30% 
· Higher than 30% 
· 35% and higher 
  
· 4% presumptive return on the value of 
savings deposits, bonds, immovable 
property 
· Actual return higher than 4% 
· Actual return lower than 4% 
· Return on shares 
   
Box 4 (corporations) 
· 35%1 
  
· Retained profits 
   
Box 5 (nontaxable entities) 
· Exempt 
  
· Capital income of pension funds 
· Interest paid to non-residents 
 
                                                                 
1 A shareholder is deemed to be a dominant shareholder if (s)he (and associated persons) holds at least 
5% of the shares of a (closely-held) company. 
2 Profits up to euro 22,686 are taxed at 30%. 
3 This labor or capital income is taxed also as corporate profits in box 4. 
4 The nominal tax rate is 25%, but due to cumulation with the corporation tax rate of 35%, the effective 
tax rate will be higher depending on the time at which profits are distributed. The effective tax rate on 
profits distributed out of current profits is 51,25% [(35% + 25%(100-35)]. 
5 Effective tax rates are lower on account of a basic wealth exemption of euro 17,000 (euro 34,000 for 
couples). 
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Table 1. Real Capital Costs of Marginal Investments before/after Tax Reform1 
 
Types of investors      
 Equity2 of which  Debt 
  New 
shares 
Retained 
profits 
 
Average marginal tax rates3 
Corporations 
-ordinary shareholders 
-dominant shareholders 
Proprietorships 
Owner-occupied housing 
 
 
2.9/5.9 
3.1/5.5 
2.2/4.5 
2.3/3.8 
 
 
6.1/6.1 
3.9/6.8 
- 
- 
 
 
2.6/5.9 
3.0/5.3 
- 
- 
 
 
3.0/3.0 
2.9/2.9 
2.2/2.5 
2.0/2.4 
 
High marginal tax rates4 
Corporations 
-ordinary shareholders 
-dominant shareholders 
Proprietorships 
Owner-occupied housing 
 
 
 
 
1.6/5.9 
1.0/5.2 
0.6/5.0 
1.2/3.8 
 
 
 
6.1/6.1 
1.3/6.5 
- 
- 
 
 
 
1.1/5.9 
0.9/5.0 
- 
- 
 
 
 
3.0/3.0 
2.9/2.9 
1.4/1.8 
1.2/1.8 
Institutional investors  
Company with ordinary 
shareholders 
 
5.9/5.9 
 
6.1/6.1 
 
5.9/5.9 
 
3.0/3.0 
 
Source: Bovenberg and Ter Rele (1998). 
                                                                 
 
 
 
                                                                 
1 On the basis of a nominal interest rate of 6% and an inflation rate of 2%. Accordingly, without 
taxation, the real cost of capital would be 4%. 
2 Equity financed investments of companies are assumed to consist of 10% newly issued shares and 
90% retained profits. 
3 To compute the return after tax of equity financed investments, 10% of the wealth of households is 
assumed to fall under the exemption of euro 10,000 (euro 20,000 for couples) of the presumptive 
capital income tax. The average marginal tax rate of the income tax in box 1 is 41%. 
4 The top marginal income tax rates are 60 % before the reform and 52% (in box 1) after the reform. 
Personal wealth is assumed to exceed the exemption under the presumptive capital income tax. 
